The fourth-down decision
Every fourth down is a choice between three actions: go for it and try to keep the drive alive, punt and flip field position, or attempt a field goal for three points. For decades coaches defaulted to punting, but modern analytics show that on short yardage and near midfield, going for it is frequently the higher-value play. This tool puts numbers on each option so you can see why.
How it works
The engine compares the expected points of each choice. Going for it is scored as:
go EP = P(convert) * EP(new first down) + P(fail) * EP(opponent ball)The conversion probability comes from historical NFL rates by yards to go — about 68 percent on 4th-and-1, dropping to roughly 30 percent at 4th-and-10. Field position is valued on a linear scale running from about plus six points at the opponent goal line to negative values deep in your own territory. A failed fourth down hands the opponent the ball, so their field-position value is subtracted from your perspective. The field-goal option weights three points by the make probability for that attempt distance, and the punt option estimates the opponent’s starting field position after a net 40-yard punt.
Tips and context
The clearest takeaway is that short yardage near midfield strongly favours going for it. On 4th-and-1 from the opponent’s 40, the conversion rate is high and a punt only nets a modest field-position swing, so the expected points line up behind being aggressive. The model optimises for expected points and deliberately ignores the clock and the scoreboard. In the final minutes of a one-score game, win probability becomes the right lens, and a team may rationally kick a field goal or punt even when expected points say otherwise. Treat the recommendation as the analytically neutral baseline, then adjust for situation.