STRIDE is a threat-modeling mnemonic created at Microsoft covering six threat categories: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, and Elevation of Privilege. Each category maps to a security property — authentication, integrity, non-repudiation, confidentiality, availability, and authorization respectively.

How do I apply STRIDE per component?

You walk each component or data flow against all six STRIDE categories and ask whether that threat is realistic there. This builder generates a matrix with one row per category for every component so none get skipped.

What counts as a component?

A component is any element of your design with a trust boundary around it — an API, a service, a database, a queue, or a data flow between two of them. Listing them individually makes the analysis systematic rather than ad hoc.

When should I threat model?

Threat model during design, before code is written, and again whenever the architecture or trust boundaries change. Catching a design flaw on paper is far cheaper than fixing it after launch.

How do I prioritize the threats I find?

Score each identified threat by likelihood times impact, using a simple 1–5 scale or a method like DREAD. Then assign an owner and a due date to every High or Critical item so the model drives real mitigation work.

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Turn a vague worry into a systematic security review

Threat modeling is most effective when it is exhaustive and repeatable, not improvised. This builder applies the STRIDE framework to each component of your system, producing a matrix that forces you to consider all six threat categories everywhere — so you don’t miss the elevation-of-privilege path on the one service everyone assumed was internal.

How it works

You define the system, its scope, the assets worth protecting, and the actors and trust boundaries involved. Then you list each component or data flow. For every component the builder emits a six-row table — one row per STRIDE category — pairing the category with its security property and a guiding question, with TODO cells for whether the threat applies and what mitigates it. STRIDE maps cleanly onto security properties: Spoofing to authentication, Tampering to integrity, Repudiation to non-repudiation, Information Disclosure to confidentiality, Denial of Service to availability, and Elevation of Privilege to authorization. Walking every component against all six is what makes the review systematic.

Tips and example

Draw or sketch a data-flow diagram first, then list each box and arrow as a component so nothing is overlooked.
Be honest in the Threat? column — marking a row “no” with a one-line reason is a valid, valuable outcome.
For each real threat, write a concrete mitigation such as enforce mTLS between service and database, not just “add security”.
Prioritize using likelihood × impact, then assign owners and dates so the model produces action, not just a document.